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NATURE OF THE CASE 
T11is case involves the interpretation of a 
:iform Real Estate contract on the sale of land 
Millard County by the defendants to the plain-
:ffs. Plaintiffs filed this action in the District 
iurt of carbon County asking the court to declare 
~alid and of no further force or effect second 
1rtgages on properties in Price, carbon County, 
:ah and in Orem, Utah and that funds held by a 
~al estate agency in Burley, Idaho be declared 
ibe the property of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 
.led a motion for summary judgment on their 
implaint "''hich was granted by the trial court. 
:fendants appeal from that decision. Plaintiffs 
ipose this appeal and take the position that 
1eir motion for summary judgment was properly 
~nted by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants in their statement of fact set 
forth a number of claimed facts that were not 
before the court on this motion for summary 
judgment. Plaintiffs motion for summary judg-
ment ·was dated May 5, 1966, and was filed May 
6, 1966, and is based upon the complaint and 
u.ns 1·:1eJ.:- and counterclaim of defendants and plain-
tiffs reply to the counterclaim with the 
various eJ~ibits attached to these pleadings. 
Answers to interrogatories and depositions were 
not before the court and were not considered on 
this motion for summary judgment. 
The facts before the court on this motion 
for summary judgment are, therefore, limited 
in accordance with these pleadings above men-
c ioned and are as hereinafter set forth. 
On May 10, 1963, defendants as sellers and 
plaintiffs as buyers, entered into a Uniform 
~eal Estate contract to purchase certain lands 
in Millard County for the sum of $58,000 with 
$500 paid at the time of the signing of the 
agreement, receipt of which \·ras ac1cnowledged by 
the defendants, and the balance of $57,500 to be 
paid in installments, which installments are set 
forth in paragraph three of the contract. A 
photocopy of this contract executed by the 
pa:ccies appears as Exhibit "A" to plaintiffs 
com~1laint and as pages 5 and 6 of the judgment 
roll. 
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On the same day plaintiffs executed a 
Jn:omis::30~cy note in the amounc of $15, 500 payable 
in installments in the same amount on the same 
dates and bearing the same interest rate as set 
forc~1 j_n a portion of the second sentence in 
paj.::ag:cap11 tliree of the Uniform Real Estate Con-
!cract. This note appeaj:-s as Exhibit "B" to 
pJaintiffs complaint and is page seven of the 
judgment roll. Plaintiffs also executed a 
second mortgage on properties in Utah county, 
cci.;:-bon County, and at Burley, Idaho to secure 
::he pa~711lent of this promissory note. The des-
c~iption of these properties and the recording 
information relating to the second mortgage are 
set fOJ.::th in plaintiffs complaint. 
On the same date plaintiffs and defendants 
21so e;:ecut.ed a supplemental agreement to the 
Unifo::..:-m Real Estate Contract \·Thich provides for 
t~e pasturing of 100 head of cows and 50 head 
of calves for a period of three months during 
1963, and ot~er provisions for the operation 
o::: the farm. This supplemental agreement appears 
as Exhibit A-1 to defendants answer and counter-
claim ancl is page 17 of tl.1e judgment roll. 
Plaintiffs took possession of the farm on 
I1aj' 10, 19 GJ and conducted farming ope rat ions 
on t~,;.c farm during that sununer. They were unable 
~o Da::e b1e payment due on September 1, 1963 of 
$3,500. After the expiration of the 30 day 
~r--ace perj_ocl the defendants e::ercised their 
temcd-,.7 unde:_- paragrapl-1 16-A and gave a five day 
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notice of the default and stated in their 
notice that if the defaults were not corrected 
within the five days that the defendants as 
sellers, i:lOuld declare the contract at an end 
and repossess the property. This notice was 
dated October 1, 1963 and appears as Exhibit "C 11 
to plaintiffs complaint and pages 8 and 9 of the 
judgment roll. The plaintiffs did not correct 
ti1e default within this five day perion and 
defendants too}c possession of ·the property as 
set forth in the notice, which would be on 
October 6, 1963. Plaintiffs have never been in 
possession of the property since that date. 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract in para-
graph 16 provides three alternate remedies if 
the buyer, who is the plaintiffs herein, fail to 
maJce the payments when they became due. Sub-
paragraph A sets forth a five day ·written notice 
and a forfeiture if the defaults are-not corrected 
within the five day period and a repossession of 
the premises by the seller. Subparagraph B sets 
forth t11at the seller may bring suit to recover 
on any delinquent installment. Subparagraph C 
sets forth that the seller, upon written notice 
to the buyer, may declare the entire unpaid 
balance due and payable and treat the contract 
as a note and mortgage and foreclose 
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on it as a mortgage. 
The plaintiffs, in filing their complaint 
in Carbon County for the relief of this second 
mortgage on the properties, take the position 
that the defendants had a choice of remedies 
as set forth above in the next preceding para-
graph. Defendants made an election as provided 
under subparagraph A, forfeited the contract 
and took back the property. By making this 
election under the terms of this subparagraph 
A, they are entitled to retain what was paid 
clmm ·which was the $500 as liquidated damages 
and that they can recover no further sums. In 
support of this claim, after defendants had 
filed an answer and counterclaim and plaintiffs 
J.1ad filed their reply to the counterclaim, plain-
tiff then filed a motion for sununary judgment 
based upon these pleadings which had been filed 
and the exhibits attached thereto which are 
mentioned above which motion was dated May 5, 
1966. Defendants had filed their motion for a 
summary judgment. Both of these motions for 
summary judgment were argued to the court on 
June 21, 1966. On August 25, 1966, District 
Judge F. vl. Keller rendered a memorandum decision 
v1he:;:ein he granted plaintiffs motion for a 
summary judgment and denied defendants motion 
for a summary judgment. He signed such an 
order on October 18, 1966. The courts memoran-
dum decision and this order appear as further 
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additions to the judgment roll. 
Defendants, upon receiving this order 
granting plaintiffs motion for summary judg-
ment, then filed their motion for a rehearing 
which motion is dated October 24, 1966, and 
filed October 26, 1966. This motion for re-
hearing appears at page 19 of the judgment roll. 
On March 21, 1967, Judge I<eller rendered a memo-
randum decision denying defendants motion for 
rehearing and signed an order to that effect on 
r1arch 24, 1967. This order denying defendants 
mo·U.on for rehearing is page 20 of the judgment 
roll. His memorandum decision appears as part 
of the judgment roll, but the pages are not 
numbered. 
Of importance is the provision in Judge 
Keller's memorandum decision dated August 25, 
1966 and in his order granting plaintiffs motion 
for summary judgment dated October 18, 1966, 
wherein he states: 
"Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment 
is granted provided, hov1ever, that the 
relief sought by plaintiffs complaint 
shall not be effective under this order 
for their summary judgment until a deter-
mination of the issues can be made on 
defendants counterclaim because of claimed 
breaches of the supplemental agreement 
therein referred to." 
There are written interrogatories and answers 
follouing this order granting summary judgment to 
the plaintiff as discovery on this counterclaim 
for claimed damages under the supplemental agree-
ment. 
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On December 9, 1966, plaintiff took defendants 
deposition which depositions are in the file 
and have never been published and are still 
sealed. These written interrogatories and 
t-he answers to them and the depositions were 
all subseauent to the motion for summary judg-
ment and a:ce not before the court and were not 
considered by the court in granting sununary 
judgment to the plaintiffs; therefore, all 
statements in defendants brief relating to the 
deposition and to answers to written interroga-
tories are not before the court and should not 
have been included or mentioned in defendants 
brief. 
The issue before the court on plaintiffs 
motion for summary judgment relate to the con-
struction and legal effect of paragraph three 
of the uniform real estate contract relating 
to the scnedule of payments and paragraph 16 of 
said contract. relating to the remedies in case of 
non paymen·t. Any damages that defendants may 
be entitled to under the supplemental agreement 
Hhicn is attached to defendants answer as Exhibit 
i\.-1, was not determined or included in the order 
granting summary judgment to plaintiff, but was 
reserved for trial of the issues raised by this 
supplemental agreement and for a determination 
of claimed damages, if any, in favor of the 
defendant. 
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ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS POINT I ~ 
PROMISSORY NOTE WAS A DOWNI'AYMENT 
Defendants, in their argument, make a 
general statement that the promissory note 
was part of the downpayment under the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract. Neither the contract 
nor the note support this en nclusion. They 
were executed on the same day and the second 
~ortgage given the date to secure the promis~ 
sory note. When the payment schedule and the 
note is compared with the payment schedule in 
the contract, it appears that the note payment 
schedule is the same as the first portion of 
the second line in paragraph three of the con-
tract whid1 states: 
"In addition, buyers are to pay $3,500 
on or before September 1, 1963, $4,000 
on or before December 20, 1964, $4,000 
December 20, 1965, and $4,000 on or 
before December 20, 1966; ••• " 
Had the promissory note been intended as a down-
payment, the contract would have so recited. 
The contract makes no mention of the promissory 
note and only recites that $500 was paid with 
the signing of the agreement. 
The question of law involved and one raised 
by the motion for surrunary judgment, is whether 
or not the Uniform Real Estate Contract is clear 
and certain as to the terms and conditions of 
payment, or whether or not this portion is un-
certain and ambiguous so that the parol evidence 
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would be received to explain the ambiguity. 
we submit that the contract is clear and 
certain on the terms and conditions of payment 
and that parol evidence could not be received 
to modify the terms and conditions set forth in 
the contract. 
An analypis of this proposition is very ably 
stated by Judge Keller in his memorandum decision 
of August 25 , 1966, in making the following 
observations and conclusions: 
"The defendants advance the claim that 
this promissory note is to be considered 
as a dm·m payment. In order to prevail 
on this claim, the defendants have the 
burden of showing that the contract of 
sale is susceptible of an interpreta-
tion that the obligation created by the 
promissory note was to be considered as 
a dm·m payment or that the contract is so 
ambiguous as to permit the consideration 
of parri evidence to show that the promis-
sory note is to be considered as a down 
payment. I conclude that there is not 
upon the face of the contract any provi-
sion from which I am able to conclude that 
the $15,500.00 note was to be considered 
as a down payment or that there is any 
ambiguity authorizing the Court to consider 
parol evidence to support a conclusion 
that the $15,500.00 note was a down pay-
ment. 
As I examine the face of this contract 
I note that the property to which it refers 
is subject to an obligation to the Equitable 
Life Assurance Society of the U. S. for the 
sum of $35,000.00 and that this is the same 
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amount that is to be paid by the plain-
tiffs as is expressed in the first sen-
tence fixing installment payments of 
$4,000.00 on or before the 20th day of 
December 1963, and on or before the same 
date in each and every year thereafter 
until $35,000.00 has been paid. It is 
not an unreasonable conclusion from what 
is stated in the second sentence of Par. 
3 and the provisions of the note and the 
security given to pay the note that the 
defendants had in mind making sure that 
they received something above the indebted-
ness on the property sold rather than a 
do'ltm. payment." 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS POINT II -
THE CONTRACT IS SEPARATE AND APART FROM 
THE NOTE AND MORTGAGE 
The argument presented in plaintiffs Point I 
also applies here. 
Defendants, in their brief,state at page 
seven that there can be no question but what the 
parties were planning for the payment of the 
promissory note outside the terms of the real 
estate contract and that the installment payments 
on the contract can be easily distinguishable 
from the payments due on the promissory note. 
'de question this conclusion. On the contrary, 
the payments of the promissory note are the same 
as a portion of the payments in the contract. 
Defendants, at pages 8 and 9 of their brief 
refer to the deposition of the defendants. This 
is improper and should not even be referred to in 
the brief. As mentioned in our statement of 
facts, the depositions were taken many months 
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after the motion for summary judgment was made 
and was argued to the court and the court 
rendered its decision granting plaintiffs motion 
foramunary judgment. The file contains the 
deposition and it is still sealed and has never 
been published. It was not filed with the trial 
court until June 27, 1967, after this appeal was 
filed. 
The proper conclusion to be drawn from the 
reading of the contract, promissory note and the 
second mortgages is that they are separate docu-
ments, but they refer to the same schedule of 
payments. The contract was dated May 10, 1963, 
and the first payment was due September 1, 1963, 
over three months from the day of the contract 
and the $500 downpayrnent. 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS POINT III -
DOCUMENTS CONSTRUED TOGETHER 
We find no fault with the defendants claim 
that these documents that were executed the same 
day pertaining to the transaction should be 
construed together. This was done and these 
documents taken into consideration by Judge 
Keller in reaching his decision as indicated 
in his memorandum decision dated March 21, 1967, 
wherein 11e stated: 
"I have examined the authorities 
cited and have no difference with the 
general principles of law stated in the 
cases cited by counsel for the defen-
dants. In other words, I concede it to 
be the law that instruments relating to 
the same transaction contemporaneously 
c~:ecutcd are to be construed together, and 
'chat ·where the terms of the note and 
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mortgage are in conflict the terms of 
the note must prevail. 
The installment payments listed in 
the promissory note were part of the 
purchase price specified in the conditional 
sales contract. As pointed out in my 
original memorandum, the conditional sales 
contract gives to the defendants an elec-
tion of remedies. That election was 
exercised when the defendants chose to re-
possess the real property to which it 
relates upon the plaintiffs' failure to 
pay the first installment specified in the 
promissory note as well as in the conditional 
sales. ~contract. The defendants could have 
elected to declare the entire indebtedness 
due and sue upon the note as well as the 
contract. In stating this conclusion I am 
in effect reconciling the provisions of the 
note with the provisions of the conditional 
sales contract in compliance with the rule 
of law relied upon by the defendants to the 
effect that where two instruments relating 
to the same subject matter executed contem-
poraneously are to be construed together." 
ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS POINT IV -
RECOVERY OF THE DOWNPAYMENT IS NOT UNCONSCION· 
ABLE OR UNHEASONABLE 
In defendants argument at pages 11, 12, and 1 
defendants quote from Answers to Interrogatories 
made by the defendants. These interrogatories 
and the answers are in the same category as the 
deposition. They were submitted and answered 
some mon·ths after the summary judgment was granted 
and they are not part of the record and the judg-
ment roll to be considered by the court. It is 
improper for the defendants to refer to these 
anm·mrs to ·written interrogatories. As plaintiffs 
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vie\·1 this matter whether or not the recovery of 
the dmvnpayment is unconscionable or unreasonable 
is not an issue in this matter on the motion for 
summary judgment. This is a question of an elec-
tion of remedies under paragraph 16 of the Uniform 
Real Estate contract. i'n1en the plaintiffs default' 
in the September 1st payment of $3,500, the defen-
dants had a choice of three remedies under para-
graph 16. They could exercise a forfeiture and 
termina·te the contract an~take possession of the 
property and retain all monies theretofore paid 
as liquidated damages, or they could have brought 
suit for the delinquent installment payments, or 
the third remedy, declare the full amount due and 
foreclose as under a real estate mortgage. These 
options are set forth clearly and with particu-
larity in the contract. Defendants made their 
election and chose to terminate the contract and 
retain all monies that had been paid as liquidated 
damages as evidenced by defendants notice to the 
plaintiffs dated October 1, 1963, which appears 
as E~~hibi,.:: "C" to plaintiffs complaint and is 
pages 8 and 9 of the judgment roll. The notice 
itself mentions the three alternate remedies 
and states that they choose the remedy to terminate 
the contract. 
Subpsragraph A which sets forth the remedy 
chosen by the defendants has particular language 
on ".-.r11at shall be forfeited as liquidated damages 
for the nonperformance of the contract and states 
u.s follows: 
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"Seller shall have the right, upon failure 
of the Buyer to remedy the default within 
five days after the written notice, to be 
released from all obligations in law and 
in equity to convey said property, and all 
payments which have been made theretofore 
on this con-tract by the Buyer, shall be 
forfeited to the Seller as liquidated 
damages for the non performance of the 
contract, ••. " 
This paragraph does not refer to the down 
payment as forfeited as liquidated damages, but· 
states all sums that have been theretofore paid. 
Defendants, in their entire brief place great 
emphasis upon the language and the claim that 
the promissory note is a down payment and infer 
tJ.1at the dm·m payment is what is forfeited as 
liquidated damages. The language of the contract 
does not support the defendants in this claim. 
Since $500 was the amount that had previously 
been paid, this is the amount of cash that was 
forfci·tcd as liquidated damages and claimed by 
the defendants under their election of remedies. 
Another factor that enters in is that the 
defendants received more than the $500 paid at 
tJ.1e ·time tJ.1e agreement was signed. The supple-
mental agreement referred to provides that the 
plaintiffsshould furnish pasture for 100 head of 
adult cattle and 50 head of calves for a total 
of 150 head of cattle for the three months 
during tl.1e summer growing season. This is a 
substantial consideration in and of itslef and 
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it is in addition to the $500 cash. 
Judge Keller, in his memorandum decision 
dated March 21, 1967, taJ~es this proposition 
into consideration in reaching his decision as 
follows: 
"'This is one of those causes in which the 
court adopts the views of the defendants 
he is compelled to conclude that breach 
of the contract to sell the defendants' 
ranch to the plaintiffs is far more desi-
rable from the standpoint of the defendants 
and definitely more profitable than perfor-
mance. Five Hundred dollars in cash was 
paid on the purchase price at the time of 
·i:he e;:ecution of the contract. Simoultan-
eously with the e~~ecution of the contract, 
the plaintiffs executed promissory notes 
for tl.1e sum of fifteen thousand five hundred 
dollars and secured these notes by three 
separate real estate mortgages. If the 
defendants are permitted to recover on the 
notes for fifteen thousand five hundred 
dollars, their recovery for the breach will 
amount to sixteen thousand dollars; namely, 
one-third of the amount that the plaintiffs 
ag:;:eed to pay for the ranch -- But this is 
not all. After the execution of the con-
tract the plaintiffs signed a supplemental 
agreement that according to its terms 
deprived the plaintiffs from the right to 
use the proceeds from the crops grown in the:; 
first year of the contract to meet the obli-
gations of operating the ranch, deprived 
them of the opportunity to plow any of the 
lands in the ranch planted to grass and hay, 
and permitted the defendants to pasture one 
hundred head of adult cattle and fifty head 
of suc1:ling calves for a period of three 
mon-chs during 1963." 
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The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that under Uniform Real Estate contracts 
and like'l.1 ise, under Earnest Money Receipt Con-
tracts, where there is an option and a choice of 
remedies that if the seller exercises the remedy 
to terminate the contract and retains the monies 
that have been theretofore paid as liquidated 
damages, his election is final and the vendor 
cannot thereafter recover additional sums or 
damages for the breach of the contract or 
specific performance. See Andreasen vs. Hansen 
(1959), 8 Utah 2nd 370, 335 P 2d 404; Close vs. 
Blumenthall (1960), 11 Utah 2d 51, 354 P 2d 856; 
HcMullin vs. Shimmin (1960), 10 Utah 2d 142, 349 
p 2d 720. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly granted plaintiffs 
motion for summary judgment which precludes any 
further payments under the contract and promis-
sory note, but leaves open for trial the issue 
of \·1he·l:her or not defendants sustained any damage 
under the supplemental agreement. The trial court 
decision should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DUANE A. FRANDSEN 
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of the firm of Frandsen 
and Keller 
Professional Building 
Price, Utah 
